Economists have not been especially welcome in this debate. Many natural scientists and ecologists view the methods and mindset of economists with grave suspicion. When initially enacting the Endangered Species Act in 1973, Congress explicitly noted that economic criteria would not be included in either the listing or the designation of proposed critical habitat (Souder, 1993) . This perpetuated a theme found in earlier environmental legislation. The Supreme Court agreed with this view in the 1978 case, Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (437 U.S. 187, 184 (1978) ): ''the value of endangered species is incalculable,'' and ''it is clear from the Act's legislative history that Congress intended to halt and reverse the trend toward species extinction-whatever the cost.'' But the realities of private incentives and social tradeoffs cannot be banished by legislative or judicial fiat. While the 1978 amendments to the Endangered Species Act acknowledge economic reality, conflict over the magnitude of these tradeoffs has delayed reauthorization since 1992. Congress has kept the Act afloat and funded through continuing resolutions. Not surprisingly, the numerous bills proposed over the last six sessions divide into two camps: bills to strengthen the Act by emphasizing endangered species recovery over extinction risk (for example, H.R. 2351); and bills to weaken the Act by bringing more attention to the needs of businesses and landowners (for example, S.1180). The Clinton administration has not pushed hard either: Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt (1997) reasoned that since ''no one had ever really tried to make the Act work, [we wanted to] dust off the Act and bring it to life. . . to prove how we can both protect the environment and permit sound economic development. '' Answering the question of whether the government can pull these two camps together to make the Endangered Species Act less adversarial and more protective of endangered species requires insight into the underlying incentives at play. Unless government codifies efforts to make landowners feel like partners in species protection, the prognosis for a reformed Act is not good. By exploring and illuminating these issues, economists can help to raise the chances that when society imposes and bears costs for protecting endangered species, it is more likely to succeed.
The Endangered Species Act and the Reality of Endangered Species
Species extinction is not a new phenomenon. On a geologic time scale, five or more mass extinction episodes have been responsible for the loss of up to 84 percent of the genera or families that have ever existed (Jablonski, 1991) . Species extinction by humans also is not a new event. Prehistoric colonization of Pacific islands destroyed an estimated 2,000 species of birds, equal to about 20 percent of the presently known number (Steadman, 1995) . At least 15 genera of large animals were lost due to aboriginal colonization of Australia (Martin and Steadman, in press ). In North America, 34 genera of large animals were lost as a result of Amerindian arrival (Martin and Steadman, in press); 68 species of birds and mammals have been threatened with extinction since the 16th century, and half of them have gone extinct (Belovsky et al., 1994) .
What is new is the current rate of human-induced extinction, which appears far higher than would be implied by the past fossil record. Conservative estimates of global rates of extinction for various groups of species vary from 10 to 1,000 times the natural rates that would currently prevail (NRC, 1995; Nott et al., 1995) . The wide range arises in part because of substantial uncertainty about the number of species and inadequate monitoring of known species.
In passing the Endangered Species Act in 1973, the U.S. Congress recognized in section 2 of the Act that species have ''ecological, educational, historical, recreational and scientific value'' inadequately accounted for in the process of ''economic growth and development.'' The 1973 Act strengthened the Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1969, which, in turn, was passed to improve the Endangered Species Preservation Act of 1966. The 1973 Act was triggered partially by a dispute between the Departments of Defense and Interior over the listing of sperm whales that prohibited the use of sperm whale oil in submarines (Mann and Plummer, 1995, p. 155) . The 1973 Act is potentially the broadest and most powerful step in the long and continuing process of protecting fish, wildlife and plants through national legislation.
The purpose of the Endangered Species Act and its subsequent amendments is ''to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be conserved'' and to provide a program to conserve these species. Notice the direct reference to ecosystems, rather than just to species.
1 Natural scientists, with rare exceptions, believe the rightful objects to save are habitats or ecosystems because of their intrinsic value and because they enhance species survival. For economists, this poses additional analytical difficulties. Thinking about valuing a species is hard enough; valuing a complex combination of many species and their interactions within the context of a certain location-an ecosystem-generally should be more difficult.
The Act directs the Secretary of the Interior, through the branch of the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the Secretary of Commerce, through the National Marine Fisheries Service, to carry through the administrative process supporting the Act. The administrative process involves a series of steps: i) listing a species as ''endangered'' or ''threatened''-endangered being the more severe threat; ii) designating critical habitats for its survival; iii) prohibiting activities that enhance extinction, 1 According to the ad hoc Committee on Endangered Species appointed by the Ecological Society of America (Carroll et al., 1996) , the meaning of ''species'' in the Act ''is somewhat imprecise, but the wording recognizes that a species is made up of an assemblage of individuals that collectively express genetic, morphological, and behavioral variation, and that this variation is the basis of evolutionary change and adaptation.'' A species includes any subspecies of fish or wildlife including invertebrates such as insects, crustaceans, and mollusks, or plant including fungi. For vertebrates, any distinct population segment of a species-one with unique morphological features or genetic traits-qualifies, although distinction is to be judged on a case-by-case basis.
and creating and executing a recovery plan; and iv) removing a species from the list when it no longer is in danger.
The intention of the Endangered Species Act is to save all species. There is no explicit recognition of relative costs and benefits in the 1973 Act.
2 A species with high economic cost of recovery and possibly low economic benefits has the same standing as a species with palpably large economic benefits and small costs. Recovery plans are designed by natural scientists, specialists of the species and its habitat, assisted by applied mathematicians and ecological model builders. Recovery plans are typically designed with little regard for total or marginal economic benefits relative to costs, nor with much regard for ecological-economic interactions, including the relative value of information that allows policymakers to discriminate among alternative recovery plans.
But while the rhetoric of the Act offers no way of discriminating between environmental priorities, constraints on regulatory budgets and time make it inevitable that such priorities will be set, at least implicitly. The funds available to preserve species in the United States are clearly inadequate for the task. Of the 1,104 species in the United States listed as threatened (228) or endangered (876) as of July 1997, slightly over 40 percent have approved recovery plans, as shown in Table  1 .
3 Since approval is a quite separate matter from adequate appropriations for the recovery plan, the status of some of these species has deteriorated and the survival prospects for slightly under 60 percent are deteriorating. Moreover, recovery plans are often not developed for years, if at all. Biological analysis of recovery plans and goals suggest that more than half of listed vertebrates would remain in serious risk of extinction even after meeting population targets in their recovery plans (Carroll et al., 1996; Tear et al., 1993) .
Matters are worse than this. There are nearly 200 species for which sufficient data exist on vulnerability to warrant endangered or threatened status, but the budgets for listing are inadequate to consummate the task. The current budgetary limits allow listing species at a rate of about 100 per year. Moreover, a list of 3,600 ''indefinite'' species designated as possibly threatened or endangered was eliminated two years ago, because the list caused ''confusion about the conservation 2 Mann and Plummer (1995, pp. 156-63) have an excellent account of the political environment surrounding the endangered species debate, or lack of it, in the early 1970s. The Act looked to most on Capital Hill like feel-good legislation in which everyone could support bald eagles without any perceived downside risk. Economic considerations were absent for two key reasons: commerce and industry were disengaged, and advocates removed a critical word from the final language-practicable. Practicable was the safety valve in early bills that allowed for economic balance when needed. Only after the Fish and Wildlife Service started applying the law did Congress realize the implications of its own words. ' (61 Federal Register 7596-7597, 1996) . The list of 3,600 created a cloud of uncertainty about the economic viability of the habitats affecting the species in limbo. The list was excised because landowners' complained to their congressional representatives about the economic costs of this uncertainty. Species also bear risk due to budget constraints. Since owning land which is hospitable to an endangered species can dramatically circumscribe any development plans for that land, owners have an incentive to destroy the habitat before listing occurs, sometimes known as the ''shoot, shovel, and shut-up'' strategy. The print media routinely report cases of habitat destruction triggered by an anticipation of listing. For example, just ten days before the golden-cheeked warbler was rated by the Fish and Wildlife Service, a firm owned by Ross Perot hired migrant workers with chain saws to destroy hundreds of acres of oak and juniper warbler habitat (Mann and Plummer, 1995) . cite this incentive as ''one reason why so many species are teetering on the very brink of extinction by the time they receive protection. '' With no specific priorities for listing species as endangered, economists are not surprised that the employees in the Office of Endangered Species proceeded by listing the species that they liked best despite the prescription against ranking in the Act. A survey of their preferences demonstrated that they ranked mammals and birds above fish, amphibians, and reptiles (Brown, 1990) , and these preferences reflect the rankings of which species are actually listed (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996) . The few listed arachnids suggests they have relatively few to champion their case for candidacy. Attitudes toward invertebrates are often downright hostile as they are often perceived to be associated with disease and agricultural damage, and they appear to lack individual identity or consciousness (Kellert, 1993) .
In 1982, Congress remedied this non-scientific choice method by requiring no favoritism in listing among types of species. Since 1982, the conditions for scientific ''objectivity'' seem to have been met in the sense that listings are highly correlated with the degree of endangerment of the species, except for amphibians, whose chance of listing remains below other species (Cash, 1997) . There is no reason to believe, however, that the degree of endangerment is highly correlated with the expected net economic benefits of preservation-regardless of how one chooses to measure the benefits and costs.
Although in the early years of the Endangered Species Act no official priorities existed for which species should be listed, Congress did require several years after the passage of the act that expenditures on species should vary with a priority system in which ''degree of threat,'' ''recovery potential,'' ''taxonomy,'' and ''conflict with development'' are ordered into a 18-point scale (Simon et al., 1995) . The purpose of the system was to prevent favoritism for expenditures on larger mammals and birds, sometimes known as ''megafauna.'' Preferences are not an ingredient of science. In fact, expenditures on species have not been correlated with the 18-point index for each species, but instead are correlated with a measure of whether a species is in conflict with construction or other forms of economic activity and with a measure of megafauna (Metrick and Weitzman, 1996) . Researchers have yet to establish that recovery expenditures by federal agencies are driven by ''science,'' the only allowable criterion stipulated by Congress.
Although economic considerations are implicit in many of the decisions about whether species should be listed as endangered (or some milder category) and what sort of recovery plan should be established, the explicit legal role for economic considerations only enters the picture explicitly when the designation of critical habitat for the recovery plan is made. Critical habitat is land essential for the survival of a species-a more precise meaning is not made clear in the Act. Such land triggers a duty for all federal agencies to consult the Fish and Wildlife Service about the appropriateness of a particular land use.
Under a set of 1978 amendments to the Act, the Secretary of the Interior (Sec. 4) may ''take into consideration the economic impact, and any other relevant impact, of specifying any particular area as critical habitat'' for a threatened or endangered species, and can exclude an area from critical habitat designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh the benefits to specifying the critical habit, ''unless failure to designate leads to extinction.'' Under the same amendments (Sec. 7), it is possible for a federal agency, the governor of a state, or a permit or license applicant to apply to the Secretary of the Interior for an exemption from the Act. The Secretary then submits a report to a committee, sometimes called the ''God Squad,'' that discusses, among other things, the availability of reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency's proposed action, and ''the nature and extent of the benefits'' of the action and proposed alternatives (Anderson, in press ). Not surprisingly, the designation of land as ''critical habitat'' is often controversial and arduous, because private parties seek not to have their lands designated in this way (NRC, 1995) . But since nearly 80 percent of all species have no critical habitat designation, this pathway to account for economic considerations is inactive in many cases.
The power of the Endangered Species Act rests with its far-reaching provisions to constrain the activities of private parties and public agencies. Private parties cannot ''take'' a listed species. A ''take'' includes ''to harass, harm, . . . wound,'' and harm encompasses habitat modification. 4 Parties caught violating the proscriptions of the Act are punished by more than a slap on the wrist. Of those prosecuted on criminal charges for illegal takings, one-fourth went to jail for between 10 to 1,170 days, one-fourth paid fines from $1000 to $50,000, and many others were put on probation (GAO, 1995a) .
Private parties can avoid these perils by requesting an ''incidental take'' provision. A person can qualify for an incidental take by submitting and receiving approval of a habitat conservation plan, which specifies how the habitat will be developed in a way that must minimize the ''impact of a taking'' and ''not appreciably'' impinge on the probability of survival or recovery. Private parties can be very much affected by how stringently the ''harass'' and ''harm'' wording is interpreted. In the past, critics of the Act have cited some impressive examples of government dedication to the letter of the law that may seem to go beyond common sense (Mann and Plummer, 1995) . As an illustration that is perhaps not representative, a timber company was prohibited from harvesting timber on 72 acres because a pair of northern spotted owls were located on public land 1.6 miles away, but within the protected ''owl circle,'' an area the size of about 6,500 football fields (Sugg, 1994) . To date, 31 habitat conservation plans have been approved and 200 are waiting approval or being developed (GAO, 1995a; U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service/National Marine Fisheries Service, 1997).
Performance of the Act
Has the Endangered Species Act slowed the perceived trends in extinction? The question is difficult to answer, in part because the 25 years since the passage of the Act is a brief period to judge whether trends in extinction rates have changed, and because the ecological literature is by no means decided on a clear technical definition of ''recovery' ' (Tear et al., 1993) . Measuring the effectiveness of the Act requires one to decide when to declare victory. Should it be when a listed species is taken off the list? When a declining trend is reversed? When the rate of extinction is slowed? When critical habitat is protected so as to prevent species from declining to the point of being considered for listing? Although the answers to these questions are unclear and notwithstanding our pleasure from keeping favorite species like the bald eagle around, only one with modest expectations would give the Endangered Species Act a high performance rating.
Since the inception of the Act in 1973, 11 species of more than 1,000 listed have recovered and have been removed from the list, including the eastern states brown pelican, Utah's Rydberg milk-vetch, and the California gray whale. Species downlisted to threatened from endangered include the Aleutian Canada goose, greenback cutthroat trout, Virginia round-leaf birch and bald eagle (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1996) . According to the Environmental Defense Fund, less than 10 percent of the listed species have exhibited an improved status and the status of four times that amount is declining. For example, the population of Attwater's prairie-chicken, listed in 1967, has dropped to 42 in 1996 from 2,254 birds in 1975. The ratio of declining species to improving species is 1.5 to 1 on federal lands, and 9 to 1 on private lands.
Funding for the endangered species program of the Fish and Wildlife Service has failed to keep pace with the number of listed species, with the result that the real budget per species is 60 percent of its 1976 level. The Office of Endangered Species has inadequate funds to assay the status of about one-third of the listed species .
Economic Benefits and Costs of the Endangered Species Act
Most of the services provided by endangered species, including their corresponding levels of biological diversity, are not priced by the market. Some people see no need to quantify the benefits of these services, which in their view are either obvious or impossible to capture-so that measurement is either unnecessary or futile (for example, Roughgarden, 1995, p. 153) . In this view, it is enough that natural science dictates a target, so that planners can go about their attempts to establish a level of preservation that guarantees survival of the species in question (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952) .
Essentially, the approach of the Act that prohibits any activity that harms a listed species puts a very large or infinite value on avoiding extinction. This view places endangered species beyond the reach of economic tradeoffs, and the economist is relegated to helping find the least cost solution to achieve a biologicalbased standard. Others take an opposing approach. They want hard evidence that the benefits of preservation exceed the alternative uses of these resources (Epstein, 1995, p. 278) . From this view, comparing the costs and benefits of endangered species protection is only logical: resources are scarce, and some attempt should be made to balance the costs and benefits so that policymakers are allocating funds to their highest valued use, given plausible adjustments for uncertainty in ecosystem functions and irreversibility.
What is known about the private and social benefits of the Endangered Species Act? The private benefits derived from species protection include commercial use, consumptive use, and recreation.
One commercial use that has received considerable popular attention are possible new pharmaceutical products. Examples include the drug vincristine used to treat leukemia, derived from the rare plant called the rosy periwinkle, and the Pacific yew tree that produces taxol used in ovarian cancer treatment, a market estimated to reach $1 billion in 1996 (Norton, 1995) . Taxol provided the template for a synthetic drug which replaced it. Some people use these examples as compelling evidence that justifies saving the totality of the world's variety of genetic and biochemical resources-after all, who knows where the next breakthrough to cure cancer or AIDS may come from? With new and future breakthroughs in biotechnology, so the argument goes, preserving all parts of nature only makes common sense because there is no end to the potential beneficial uses of rare species.
While no substitute exists for biodiversity as a whole, measuring commercial value requires insight into substitution possibilities and the marginal contribution that each species makes to finding a new and useful product. The expected value of a marginal species equals the expected payoff from testing it times the probability that all other species fail to provide the desired product. If one species substitutes for another in potential market success, the marginal value of an extensive genetic exploration declines as the odds increase that a firm will find a profitable species quickly. Simpson et al. (1996) provide an example which helps to illuminate the range of potential values. They make a variety of more-or-less plausible assumptions: for example, one scenario suggests that there is a 95 percent chance of getting 10 new products by sampling 250,000 species; that once a new product is identified, a $300 million investment will yield $450 million from the new product; and so on. At one end of their range of estimated values, the maximum value of saving a marginal species is estimated at slightly less than $10,000; however, when there are more species to choose from and the chances of finding a successful product are higher, the expected value of preserving a marginal species can be less than one cent. Although the value of some species is enhanced by introducing prior knowledge about the likely significance of species or ecosystems, the associated cost is to reduce the value of other species (Rausser and Small, 1997) . As such, it is doubtful that the bio-prospector will be the savior of endangered species, and it will be some time before we understand ecosystem functions well enough to measure accurately the marginal value product of ecosystem components contributing to market goods.
Commercial and recreational harvesting of species are perhaps the most straightforward commercial benefit to estimate given a tangible market price. Angler and hunting expenditures amounted to about $60 billion in 1996 (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, 1997). Commercial and recreational salmon fishing in the Pacific Northwest helps support 60,000 jobs and over $1 billion in personal income in the regional economy (Irvin, 1995) . Ecotourism is another economic benefitmany people are willing to pay to view rare species, like the $200 million California whale-watching industry. Global ecotourism expenditures have been estimated at $90-$200 billion in 1988, with about 15 percent spent in North America (Filion et al., 1994) . But the ecotourist is also unlikely to be a broadbased savior for endangered species: not many endangered or threatened insects or funguses will qualify for preservation on these grounds.
Estimating the social value of endangered species protection is even more challenging. Most economists now acknowledge that people might have preferences about protecting species and related services they will rarely ever, if at all, see or use (Krutilla, 1967) . The main point of contention is over trying to put a monetary value on these preferences. The primary tools for trying to accomplish this are public opinion surveys, known as contingent evaluation surveys, which use a sequence of questions to put a monetary value on personal preferences. As one might expect, this method is highly contentious, because people are responding to a survey rather than facing their own budget constraint and actually spending their own money.
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For endangered species, the reported results from this literature suggest that the average person's lump sum willingness to pay for sea turtle or bald eagle preservation ranges from $12.99 to $254; and that individual annual willingness to pay ranges from $6 for striped shiner to $95 for northern spotted owl preservation (Loomis and White, 1996) . A piecemeal species-by-species approach, however, most likely overestimates economic benefits. To illustrate, if one summed the stated preferences from various endangered species surveys as a crude measure of benefits, the average person was willing to pay about $1000 to protect 18 different species. Multiplying $1000 by the number of U.S. households suggests that we would be willing to pay over 1 percent of GDP to preserve less than 2 percent of the endangered species. Many will find these values to be suspiciously high.
Contingent valuation surveys have other notable problems. Critics complain that hypothetical surveys often elicit surrogate preferences for environmental protection in general, rather than for the specific species in question. 6 For example, McClelland et al. (1992) found that up to one-half of the reported values for a specific environmental charge can be attributed to surrogate values. The fraction appears to depend on the contextual information provided in the survey. In addition, most people are unfamiliar with the services provided by endangered species. A recent survey found that over 70 percent of Scottish citizens were completely unfamiliar with the meaning of biodiversity (Hanley and Spash, 1993) , and there is little reason to expect substantially more knowledge in the United States (Coursey, 1997). These problems suggest that measuring the benefits of endangered species protection remain elusive and contentious. Tests of the internal and external consistency of stated preferences are a high research priority (Diamond, 1996) .
Moreover, most contingent value experiments have attempted to put a value on what might be called ''charismatic megafauna''-mainly large animals that many people already see clearly and fondly in their mind's eye-not on the thousands of other species that comprise an ecosystem, but whose existence is unknown to most people. Nevertheless, valuing low-profile species would seem to be a natural outcome of valuing high-profile species, to the extent that high-profile species depend on low-profile ones. The high-profile species' derived demands for the low-profile species implies certain values for the low profile species as ''intermediate goods'' (Crocker and Tschirhart, 1992) .
It seems implausible that private benefits of preserving endangered species, including commercial and consumptive use, will be sufficient to justify preservation efforts that would be as extensive as many would like to see. Despite the extraordinary analytical difficulties associated with measuring the social value that should be placed on preserving each species, determining at least a plausible range for these values would seem to be essential if we are to make judgments about the benefits of preservation.
The benefit side could be sidestepped to some extent by turning to measures like the costs per species saved. But the costs are not much easier to get a handle on, as they are often illustrative but not representative. The opportunity costs of the Endangered Species Act include the foregone opportunities due to restrictions on the use of property due to listings, designation of critical habitat, and recovery plans. Opportunity costs also include the reduced economic rents from restricted or altered development projects, agriculture production, timber harvesting, minerals extraction, recreation activities, wages lost by displaced workers who remain unemployed or who are re-employed at lower wages, lower consumer surplus due to higher prices, and lower capital asset value.
Opportunity costs have been estimated for a few high-profile, regional conflicts. For example, the Bonneville Power Administration estimated that its expenditure on salmon conservation was about $350 million in 1994 (1 percent of 1994 revenues), of which about $300 million represented the opportunity cost of lost power revenues (NRC, 1995) . Another study estimated that a recovery plan that increased the survival odds of the northern spotted owl to 91 percent, preserving about 1900 owl pairs, would decrease economic welfare by $33 billion (1990 dollars), excluding ecosystem and preservation benefits, with a disproportionate share of the losses borne by the regional producers of intermediate wood products (Montgomery et al., 1994) . If the recovery plan tried to achieve a goal of a 95 percent survival odds with 2400 owl pairs, costs increased to $46 billion. For perspective, the value of rights to cut the old growth timber on the 6,500 football field area necessary to support one owl pair is more than $650 million. The cost could be reduced by 50 percent if some of the owl's range was reduced (Montgomery, 1995) , but the Act requires that species be preserved throughout their spatial range.
Opportunity costs have also been estimated for critical habitat designation in a few cases: the Virgin River basin for the wound fin, Virgin River chub, and Virgin spinedace; and Colorado River basin for the razorback sucker, humpback chub, Colorado squawfish, and bonytail (Brookshire et al., 1994 (Brookshire et al., , 1995 . Several conclusions emerge from these studies. The difference in economic output for a region (in this case, say a county) with and without critical habitat designation is relatively small, often measuring in the range of one-fiftieth of a percentage point. The impact of critical habitat designation on regional income, tax revenues, and employment is similar. But the impact of critical habitat designation is not evenly distributed across regions and states; for example, a given streamflow requirement may have a negative impact on recreation, electric power production, and future consumptive use in some states, but enhance these activities in other states.
The transaction costs of dealing with habitat conservation plans would be another element of the costs. The private transaction costs for dealing with the Act include the time and money spent applying for permits and licenses, redesigning plans, and legal fees. Estimates of these costs for the Act do not exist. As a crude comparison, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, or Superfund, generates private party transaction costs of about 30 cents on the dollar (Dixon, 1995) . Since the Endangered Species Act does not employ the same far-reaching liability system of Superfund, its transaction costs should be considerably smaller.
Finally, estimates of opportunity costs also exist with regard to public resources devoted to endangered species. In a General Accounting Office report on 58 approved recovery plans, 34 of the plans had a total cost estimate for carrying out the recovery, 23 plans had cost estimates for the initial years of recovery, and one had a cost estimate for one part of a twelve-part plan (GAO, 1995b) . Of the 34 total cost estimates for public agencies, estimates ranged from a 1994 cost of $145,000 for the White River spinedace to a 1991 estimate of about $154 million for the green sea turtle and loggerhead turtle. The total estimated cost for the 34 species was approximately $700 million. For the 23 plans with initial three-year estimates, costs range from a 1990 estimate of $57,000 for the Florida scrub jay to a 1991 estimate of $49.1 million for the black-capped vireo (a bird). The three-year total cost for the 23 species was over $350 million in the early 1990s (a figure not adjusted to current dollars). For the ''high-priority'' actions, the total estimated costs is about $223 million for three years.
Of the money actually expended on endangered species recovery by federal and state agencies between 1989 and 1991, over 50 percent was spent on the top ten species: bald eagle ($31.3 million), northern spotted owl ($26.4 million), Florida scrub jay ($19.9 million), west Indian manatee ($17.3 million), redcockaded woodpecker ($15.1 million), Florida panther ($13.6 million), grizzly bear ($12.6 million), least Bell's vireo ($12.5 million), American peregrine falcon ($11.6 million), and whooping crane ($10.8 million) (Metrick and Weitz-man, 1996) . Over 95 percent of identifiable expenditures have been on vertebrates, suggesting that visceral identification with certain species has influenced resource allocation decisions more than scientific characteristics such as degree of threat or recovery potential.
How do these cost estimates translate into national levels? We do not knowno nationwide estimate exists of whether the Act has shaved percentage points off the gross domestic product. One study explored the association between the Act and economic growth by looking for a connection across the 50 states in the number of species listings in each state and either construction employment or gross state product between 1975 (Meyer, 1995 . Although no negative relationship was found-for example, Alabama had 70 listed species and a booming economy, while Louisiana had 21 listings and a dormant economy-this study made no effort to estimate national opportunity costs. Surely the impact of the Act is less than that estimated for generic environmental regulation and global climate change policy, and estimates in this area range from 0.2 percent to 1 percent losses in annual GDP (Jorgenson and Wilcoxon, 1990; Weyant, 1996) .
Moreover, a national cost estimate might not be necessary right now. America is a large nation, and domestic and foreign substitutes exist for many goods and services affected by the Act. Rather, people are concerned with the redistribution of wealth in regional conflicts like the Northern spotted owl. The political process of ''managing the losers'' seems to be the question of today. National cost estimates, however, might be the question of tomorrow-especially if the pace of urban expansion accelerates beyond the estimated 900,000 acres converted every year (Council on Environmental Quality, 1997); or if a modicum of respect drops anchor on wide-eyed schemes like those proposing to set aside half the land area of the 48 contiguous states as nature reserves for endangered species (Noss and Cooperrider, 1994) .
Improving the Endangered Species Act
Economics can and should contribute to the debate over reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act.
First, economists can frame the endangered species debate in benefit-cost terms. Such calculations are bound to be uncomfortable and controversial, especially since the overwhelming fraction of benefits from the preservation of endangered species are likely to be in the nature of public goods whose benefits are received in the future. But it is doubtful whether encyclopedic species protection regardless of cost is even possible, and if possible, whether it holds a moral trump card over all other priorities such as the health and welfare of today's children (Guha, 1997) . Economists naturally seek criteria and conduct analysis which permit a discrimination among species in recognition of the existence of budget constraints. Of course, anyone who offers analysis which leads to an increased risk of a species becoming extinct will suffer attacks, but the present system is assuredly allowing many such actions, without the meliorating grace of admitting or examining them openly.
The administration of the Endangered Species Act could also take a more proactive role by moving away from the approach of identifying species and recovery plans one at a time, and moving toward identifying critical habitat for listed and unlisted species, and then designing a voluntary compensation scheme for critical habitat that cuts across the holdings of public and private landowners. This would be in keeping with the original intention of the law, which, as described earlier, placed an emphasis on preserving ecosystems, not just species. Andrew Metrick and Martin Weitzman take up the question of how to conceptualize the issue of endangered species protection in their paper in this symposium-and offer a somewhat discouraging evaluation of how the key elements that should be represented in such calculations are not being taken into account in the present administration of the Endangered Species Act.
A second task for economists in reform of the Endangered Species Act is to point out that whether and which species are or soon will be endangered are not purely ecological questions, but are in part economic questions too. After all, economic variables influence the likelihood of extinction-and even evolution (Munro, 1997) . Species are more likely to be endangered the more they conflict with economic development that causes, say, habitat fragmentation. Species are less threatened the greater the conservation efforts. Since development and conservation decisions depend on economic parameters such as relative prices and income, so does the probability of species extinction. Economists must continue to stress to the natural sciences that economic parameters affect their ability to estimate the risk of extinction accurately.
Third, the net benefits of the Endangered Species Act might be dramatically increased if an amended Act provides economic rewards to landowners for good stewardship of actual and prospective habitat and species thereon. More than 90 percent of the listed species had some of their habitat on private land as of 1993 and more than one-third were completely on non-federal lands (GAO, 1995a) , so the cooperation of private landowners is vital to the preservation of endangered species. Without such cooperation, landowners have strong incentives to minimize the risk of economic loss to a taking under the Act by hindering the gathering of information about species on their land, or at the extreme, by destroying potential habitat overtly before the species are listed and covertly afterwards. As an example, one owner of 7,200 acres of timber had to forgo harvest on 1,560.8 acres to protect 12 colonies of red-cockaded woodpeckers. To avoid further restriction if the woodpeckers expanded to new territory, the owner, who was actually fairly conservation-oriented, said he would ''start massive clear-cutting,'' halving the rotation time to 40 years. Since habitat for the woodpecker often occurs when the existing tree cavities are destroyed by frequent burns and rot, this action would not destroy habitat, but would avoid creating any additional habitat (Stroup, 1995) .
A variety of compensation schemes are possible: direct compensation from the government to owners of land that is taken; tradable rights in habitat, under which those who wish to develop land would buy permits from those who would then not be able to develop; 7 insurance programs under which landowners are compensated if endangered species impose costs on them, like the fund created by Defenders of Wildlife under which rangers are compensated when wolves destroy lifestock (Goldstein and Heintz, 1993) ; or tax breaks to allow large chunks of land to be preserved, rather than broken up to pay federal estate taxes . In our view, any such system should be voluntary for the private landowners, flexible enough to accommodate a single large or several small reserves, provide incentives for the landowner to reveal private information on the owner's ability to profit from the land, account for the deadweight loss of the funds used to compensate acre setasides, and account for the shadow value of a constraint that sets minimum odds of survival (Smith and Shogren, 1998) .
None of the methods of using compensation to align the incentives of private landowners with the preservation of endangered species is simple or straightforward to implement. Compensation for private landowners could be subject to concocted claims and possibly extensive litigation; some of the compensation schemes proposed in recent bills to reauthorize the Endangered Species Act seem especially illconceived (Goldstein, 1996) . Trading habitat requires ways of measuring what quantity and quality of habitat is ''equivalent''-not a simple task. Widespread use of the insurance mechanism may be curtailed because of the costs of ascertaining the true losses to property owners, and the moral hazard problem that insured owners will have less reason to avoid damage. It is not obvious that tax breaks for preserving large estates would generate more benefits than simply buying the land, or allowing it to be sold with some sort of easement, and the political attractiveness of providing additional tax breaks to wealthy landowners is questionable.
The pros and cons of these sorts of voluntary incentive programs are currently being discussed more by natural scientists than by economists (for example, Eisner et al., 1995) , but economists can make a contribution by providing a better understanding of the economic nature of these schemes. In this symposium, the paper by Robert Innes, Stephen Polasky and John Tschirhart addresses the question of how various requirements for compensation would affect incentives for landowners and for the government.
Finally, these general steps that should be taken to improve the Endangered Species Act will involve a modest addition to government expenditures. Over the last couple of decades, budgets for administering the Act have not grown to match the perceived problem.
At present, the Endangered Species Act sets a lofty rhetorical goal of saving every species, while making no distinctions among species except those governed by ''science,'' a term left largely undefined. It is driven by the belief that risk of 7 The Environmental Defense Fund goes further in substitution possibilities when it proposes that a landowner who wants to destroy habitat for one species can do so by buying equivalent habitat for another species . extinction is a question best left to the natural sciences; if economics is allowed in the door at all, it is relegated to task of managing the risk levels determined by others (Carroll et al., 1996) . The Act largely ignores the importance of the incentives facing private landowners. These are shortcomings that economists are wellsuited to address.
